Date: Wednesday 26 October 2016
Time: 4.00pm – 6.00pm
Venue: JG 4006 (John Galsworthy building)
Price: free

‘Web-Enabled Policy Advice – Modelling the Saudi Arabian Labour Market’ by Davoud Taghawi-Nejad (University of Oxford)

Booking and further information: http://www.kingston.ac.uk/events/item/2338/26-oct-2016-economics-research-seminar-with-davoud-taghawinejad-and-willem-spanjers/
Contact: Antoine Godin (A.Godin@kingston.ac.uk)

Abstract: One of Saudi Arabia’s principal problems is unemployment of Saudi nationals, which is, at least partially, caused by the fact that seven million expatriates reside in the country and hold the majority of the available jobs. In order to address this problem we created a data-driven agent-based policy simulator of the Saudi labour market. The purpose of our model was to evaluate Saudi Arabia’s policy options to increase employment of Saudi nationals: taxes on expatriates, quotas, and minimum wages (in general and for expatriates).
The model consists of Saudi and expatriate workers and Firms that hire employees. Firms prefer to hire workers with the best productivity – cost profile, but hire in accordance with the law. Their behaviour has been calibrated with time-series and firm-level data. It is possible to run the simulation with different policies, which influence the firm’s decisions and therefore the simulation outcomes. With the agent-based model we showed the best policy answer for each sector. This model was delivered not only as part of an academic paper but also as a web-enabled policy simulator. Beyond testing and designing policy, the model could also be used to train policymakers’ intuition and understanding of the labour market. In the second half of the talk I will address the use of policy simulators in policy advice and our experience in working with the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Labour in particular.

‘Liquidity Provision, Ambiguous Asset Returns and the Financial Crisis’ by Willem Spanjers (Kingston University)

Abstract: For an economy with dysfunctional intertemporal financial markets the financial sector is modelled as a competitive banking sector offering deposit contracts. In a setting similar to Allen and Gale (1998, [1]) properties of the optimal liquidity provision are analysed for illiquid assets with ambiguous returns. In the context of the model, ambiguity – i.e. incalculable risk – leads to dynamically inconsistent investor behaviour. If the financial sector fails to recognize the presence of ambiguity, unanticipated fundamental crises may occur, which are incorrectly blamed on investors ‘loosing their nerves’ and ‘panicking’.
The basic mechanism of the current financial crisis resembles a banking panic in the presence of ambiguous asset returns. The combination of providing additional liquidity and supporting distressed financial institutions implements the regulatory policy suggested by the model.
A credible commitment to such ‘bail-out policy’ does not create a moral hazard problem. Rather, it implements the second best efficient outcome by discouraging excessive caution. Reducing ambiguity by increasing stability, transparency and predictability – as suggested by ordo-liberalism and the ‘Freiburger Schule’ – enhances ex-ante welfare.

How to find us: The seminar takes place at Penryhn Road Campus (Kingston upon Thames, Surrey, KT1 2EE). Public Transport: take train from London Waterloo to Surbiton (20 mins approx.) and walk (15 mins approx.) or buses 71, 281, K2, K3 (5 mins approx.) from Surbiton Station to Kingston University. For further details and driving directions, please go http://www.kingston.ac.uk/aboutkingstonuniversity/location/howtofindus/penrhynroad/